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INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (AI) has infiltrated the administrative state.1 
On December 3, 2020, the Trump Administration released an “Executive 
 
* Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, New York 
University School of Law.  Bridget Pals (NYU 2021) and Eddie Percarpio (NYU 
2022) provided extraordinary research assistance. Mike Livermore provided 
helpful feedback. 
1. Cognizant that “[t]here is no universally accepted definition of ‘artificial 
intelligence,’” this article follows the lead of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS) in defining the umbrella term broadly: 
AI systems tend to have characteristics such as the ability to learn 
to solve complex problems, make predictions, or undertake tasks 
that heretofore have relied on human decision making or 
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Order on Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the 
Federal Government.”2 As part of its “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial 
Intelligence Applications,” released on November 17, 2020, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to “consider how best to 
promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, 
insufficient, or excessively burdensome” and then to “modify, streamline, 
expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.”3 
Retrospective review of existing regulations is not a new phenomenon; the 
Trump Administration followed the Obama Administration (and prior to 
that, the Clinton Administration) in urging such review. But the novel use 
of artificial intelligence to identify rules that should be subject to 
retrospective analysis warrants attention and further exploration. 
OMB’s general agency guidance followed closely on the heels of 
the “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” final rule published on November 16, 
2020, by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).4 As HHS 
explained: 
While retrospective regulatory review and reform has until 
now been a largely manual process, new technologies exist 
that can support policy subject matter experts (SMEs) in 
their efforts to review large amounts of regulatory text. As 
part of HHS’s pioneering efforts to pilot the use of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other advanced analyses, 
HHS recently applied AI and Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) technology to support and accelerate SME reviews 
in cognizant divisions of HHS of unstructured text in the 
 
intervention. There are many illustrative examples of AI that can 
help frame the issue . . . . [including] AI assistants, computer 
vision systems, biomedical research, unmanned vehicle systems, 
advanced game-playing software, and facial recognition systems 
as well as application of AI in both information technology and 
operational technology.   
Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Statement #20, Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence, 86 
Fed. Reg. 6616 (Jan. 22, 2021). 
2. E.O. 13960, The White House, Exec. Order on Promoting the Use of 
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Fed. Gov’t (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-promoting-use-
trustworthy-artificial-intelligence-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/U294-9P2
2] [hereinafter E.O. 13960].  
3. Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications, at 11 (Nov. 17, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMB-
Memo-on-Regulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/H39P-L297] [hereinafter 
OMB AI Memo]. OMB noted that its guidance was in accordance with Exec. Order 
No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
4. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020). 
376 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 374 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), facilitating the 
identification of opportunities to improve HHS’s 
regulations.5 
The “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” rule made non-substantive changes to 
existing HHS regulations, such as “correcting references to other 
regulations, misspellings, and other typographical errors.”6 
The seemingly mundane nature of this final rule, however, should 
not obscure its revolutionary import. To begin, it is (as far as I am aware) 
the first use of AI in a final rule and one that has (thus far) escaped 
widespread attention. This particular use case for AI in rulemaking was 
overlooked in “Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal 
Administrative Agencies,” a February 2020 comprehensive report (for 
which I served as one of four lead authors) that surveyed AI use cases 
across federal agencies.7 This Article adds to our understanding of those 
federal agency AI use cases, specifically with regard to rulemaking 
applications. 
Beyond buttressing our understanding of agencies’ current and 
potential future uses of AI in rulemaking, this Article spotlights HHS’s 
innovative use of AI in the retrospective review process. The “Regulatory 
Clean Up Initiative” is HHS’s opening gambit, the first rule to emerge out 
of a years-long pilot project. Back in September 2019, at a presentation at 
The White House Summit on Artificial Intelligence in Government, the 
HHS Associate Deputy Secretary discussed a pilot project underway using 
AI to assist agencies’ retrospective review process by identifying outdated 
 
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. David Freeman Engstrom et al., Government by Algorithm: Artificial 
Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. REP., 
(Feb. 2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS
-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/38AW-SPXC]. The Administrative Conference of 
the United States (ACUS), an independent federal agency that convenes experts to 
recommend improvements to administrative process and procedure, commissioned 
this study on the current uses of artificial intelligence in the federal administrative 
state. ACUS’s follow-on Statement on “Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence” (see 
supra note 1), which aimed to explore how federal regulatory agencies can “take 
advantage of these new tools in ways consistent with due process and other legal 
norms” likewise did not address the context of retrospective review or rulemaking 
more generally. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Statement #20, Agency Use of Artificial 
Intelligence, (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Statement%2020%20Agency%20Use%20of%20Artificial%20Intelligence.pdf. 
Presumably the AI uses in retrospective review across different agencies—
hitherto largely below the radar—will surface, as the December 3, 2020, Exec. 
Order mandates that “each agency shall prepare an inventory of its non-classified 
and non-sensitive use cases of AI . . . including current and planned uses, consistent 
with the agency’s mission.” E.O. 13960, supra note 2. 
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or overly burdensome rules or areas of duplication and overlap among 
agencies.8 And now, within the November 2020 rule itself, HHS has 
signaled broader expansions and future rulemaking uses of the AI-driven 
technologies: “Future uses of these technologies to promote comprehensive 
and systematic retrospective review will continue to algorithmically refine 
identification of potentially ‘outmoded’ regulations and will seek 
algorithmic characterization of . . . regulations which are ‘ineffective, 
insufficient, or excessively burdensome,’ as candidates for SME review and 
potential reform.”9 
This Article is the first to explore the significant administrative law 
issues that agencies will face as they devise and implement AI-enhanced 
strategies to identify rules that should be subject to retrospective review. 
Part I introduces the effect of politics on retrospective review by canvassing 
both the consistencies and differing emphases of the relevant executive 
orders across the Obama and Trump Administrations. The HHS pilot is then 
presented as an innovative case study in its own right that also frames some 
generalizable salient administrative law design and oversight issues. In 
addition to promulgating the first rule using AI technologies, HHS has 
historically provided robust descriptions of its approach to identifying 
regulations for retrospective review. HHS, moreover, has put itself forward 
as the leading federal agency for “regulatory reform.”10   
Part II sheds light on both the peril and future promise of the 
deployment of AI in the retrospective review process. AI could provide a 
reliable and efficient mechanism to help agency policy officials sift through 
the thousands of pages of the CFR and target regulations of particular 
interest. Alternatively, it could instead be deployed to obscure the inputs 
and decision-making process to fuel a politically motivated agenda (either 
pro- or anti-regulatory). Against the backdrop of scant information provided 
 
8. HHS ADS Charles Keckler, THE WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN GOV’T (Sept. 2019) (PowerPoint slides, on file with Belmont Law 
Review); see also Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, White House AI Summit focuses on 
government as a user of the technology, FEDSCOOP (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.fedscoop.com/white-house-ai-summit-government-ai-use-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HQG-BA2Y] (“Charles Keckler . . . shared the agency’s ‘AI for 
deregulation’ pilot. The project, which began one year ago, aims to use natural 
language processing to find HHS regulations that may be too burdensome, obsolete 
or ineffective. The end goal, after subject matter expert review, is to eliminate or 
change these regulations in order to streamline the HHS regulatory environment.”).  
9. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72899–900. 
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ANN. REP. (2019); see also 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar Highlights 
Recognition of HHS as Top Agency for Regulatory Reform (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/17/secretary-azar-highlights-recognition-
of-hhs-as-top-agency-for-regulatory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/TN2H-U55Y] 
(reporting that Secretary Azar noted that “HHS was the No. 1 Cabinet agency in 
terms of regulatory accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2018”). 
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by HHS regarding its AI-driven approach to target regulations for 
retrospective review, this Part investigates potential factors that could 
predict which regulations may be overly burdensome, overlapping, or 
insufficiently stringent. One such factor might include whether the 
regulation’s cost-benefit analysis aligns with current best practices. Another 
factor might leverage NLP techniques to reveal patterns in comments 
regarding the sentiment of the regulated community with regard to the 
burden of a particular regulation. 
Finally, as AI infiltrates the administrative state, concerns regarding 
transparency, reasonableness, accountability, and oversight rear their heads. 
Part III tackles future challenges to be faced in the realm of AI for 
retrospective review. It is conventional received wisdom that the informal 
rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
provides “predictable and meaningful opportunities for interested 
stakeholders to provide input on draft regulations and scrutinize the 
evidence and analytic bases of regulatory proposals.”11 In its November 
2020 “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications,” 
OMB carried this conventional wisdom into the 21st century, by 
emphasizing that “[i]n soliciting public input on Notices of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRMs) that relate to AI applications, agencies will benefit 
from the perspectives and expertise of stakeholders engaged in the design, 
development, deployment, operation, and impact of AI applications, and 
facilitate a decisionmaking process that is more transparent and 
accountable.”12 But HHS’s “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” rule was not 
subject to the notice-and-comment process. The rule, moreover, offered 
only the most general description of the AI-driven NLP techniques used. 
While heeding OMB’s caution that “current technical challenges in creating 
interpretable AI can make it difficult for agencies to ensure a level of 
transparency necessary for humans to understand the decision-making of AI 
applications,”13 Part III proposes enhanced public participation and notice-
and-comment processes as necessary features of AI-driven retrospective 
review.  
I.  RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 
The value of retrospective review—namely re-assessing the costs 
and benefits of regulations sometime after they are promulgated—has been 
recognized by Democratic and Republican administrations alike. The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires agencies to publish plans to 
conduct retrospective reviews of certain regulations.14 Multiple executive 
 
11. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 12. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 11. 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 610 (2009) (providing for the periodic review of rules). 
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orders from the Obama and Trump Administrations likewise require 
agencies to submit plans for periodic reviews of certain regulations.15 
That said, the Obama and Trump Administrations approached 
retrospective review in distinct manners. Most significantly, the Trump 
Administration injected a pronounced deregulatory thrust into the 
regulatory review process, reflected in its executive orders and ultimately 
shaping the process by which agencies targeted regulations ripe for review. 
A.  Executive Order Politics  
With Executive Order 13,563, the Obama Administration urged 
retrospective review, seeking to eliminate regulations that had become 
“unjustified or unnecessary” or “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome.”16 Agencies, moreover, were required to create 
and publish Final Retrospective Review Plans.17 My review of these agency 
plans revealed several commonalities across agencies’ processes for 
targeting regulations for review.18 Typically, the agency plans drew 
attention to the number of people impacted by a regulation as well as the 
date the regulation was promulgated and the time since its most recent 
review. Next, most plans provided for the solicitation of comments, both 
internally from staff and fieldworkers and also from the general public. 
Several agency plans noted the relevance of the receipt of complaints 
regarding specific regulations or where the agency is continually granting 
compliance waivers.  
Agency plans also share similarities in the types of regulatory 
features they target for retrospective review. Complexity, for instance, 
emerged as a relevant feature, with agencies indicating a preference for 
clear, concise, and readily comprehensible rules. Most plans also identified 
changes in technological circumstances or changes in legal circumstances, 
such as the enactment of a new statute or amendment, a United States 
 
15. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); 
Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
16. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563 § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 
2011) (promoting retrospective analysis to identify rules that “may be outmoded, 
ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome”). Exec. Order No. 13563 built 
on the Clinton Administration Exec. Order No. 12866 § 5, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 
51739–40 (Oct. 4, 1993) (urging review of regulations to determine which ones 
have become “unjustified or unnecessary” or “duplicative or inappropriately 
burdensome in the aggregate”). 
17. Exec. Order No. 12866 § 5, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (requiring each agency to 
create a preliminary “program. . . under which the agency will periodically review 
its existing significant regulations”).  
18. All of the agency plans—which contain the required preliminary and final 
plans along with February 2015, July 2015, January 2016, and July 2016 updates—
are publicly available at: Office of Mgmt. & Budget, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform [https://perma.cc/WZL4-EKCJ]. 
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Supreme Court decision interpreting a statute or amendment, or an update 
to a referenced regulation. Many plans also highlighted necessary updates 
to the cost-benefit evaluation of a regulation, whether based on new 
understandings or ability to measure the relevant costs and benefits, or the 
distributional effects of the regulation, or a re-assessment based on the real 
world impacts of the regulation.  Finally, most plans evinced a concern 
regarding duplication of effort among agencies. 
The Trump Administration pushed this retrospective review 
mandate a step further. Executive Order 13,771 created a “regulatory 
budget,” requiring that, for each additional significant regulation, two 
existing regulations had to be eliminated and that the total incremental cost 
of all regulations should be no greater than zero.19 In furtherance of this 
demand, the Trump Administration required agencies to create Regulatory 
Review Task Forces (RRTFs) charged with identifying regulations that, 
among other things, “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation,” “are outdated, 
unnecessary, or ineffective,” and “impose costs that exceed benefits.”20 
Unlike the Obama Administration E.O. 13,563, the Trump 
Administration E.O. 13,771 does not call for agencies to submit plans. That 
said, my review of available agency statements from fall 2019 revealed 
some consistency across administrations.  For instance, both 
administrations flag regulations as ripe for review based upon the age of a 
regulation, the amount of time since a regulation has gone through a 
comprehensive review, the frequency of a regulation’s amendments, and 
subsequent legal developments.21 
Finally, Trump Administration Executive Order 13,924, Regulatory 
Relief to Support Economic Recovery, called for a specialized additional 
retrospective review by canvassing recent rule changes and relaxations 
conducted in response to COVID-19. This retrospective review pilot22 asked 
each agency to consider all of the changes made in response to COVID-19 
and determine whether or not those changes should remain permanently in 
effect.23 Under E.O. 13,924, agencies are required to report their findings to 
 
19. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
20. Exec. Order No. 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Feb. 24, 2017).  
21. For example, hand-in-hand with considering the age of a regulation, the 
Department of Veteran Affairs noted that some of their regulations are out of date 
in that they fail to incorporate court holdings and binding Veteran Affairs General 
Counsel opinions. See PLAN FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF. at 3 (Aug. 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/veteransaffairsregulatory
reformplanaugust2011.pdf.   
22. Adam White, Covid-19, Regulatory Recalibration, and Learning for the 
Long Run, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 20, 2020), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/covid-19-regulatory-recalibration-and-learning-for-
the-long-run/ [https://perma.cc/7PF8-EQ6W].  
23. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 22, 2020), mandates: 
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the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).24 But these lists are not 
publicly available.25 While there have been myriad COVID-related federal 
 
The heads of all agencies shall review any regulatory standards 
they have temporarily rescinded, suspended, modified, or waived 
during the public health emergency, any such actions they take 
pursuant to . . . this order, and other regulatory flexibilities they 
have implemented in response to COVID-19, whether before or 
after issuance of this order, and determine which, if any, would 
promote economic recovery if made permanent, insofar as doing 
so is consistent with the policy considerations identified in . . . 
this order, and report the results of such review to the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the 
President for Domestic Policy, and the Assistant to the President 
for Economic Policy. 
24. OMB followed up with a memo to the heads of executive departments and 
agencies, requiring, among other things:  
A list of temporary regulatory actions the agency has taken in 
response to COVID-19 along with analysis of whether each such 
action is suitable for issuance as a permanent measure to promote 
economic recovery. For each action suitable for issuance as a 
permanent measure, please also include a brief description of 
why each proposed action will promote economic recovery going 
forward; the projected timeline for issuance of a permanent 
regulatory action; any good cause, exigent circumstance, or 
emergency authorities the agency intends to invoke for issuance; 
and any other important and pertinent information.  
Russell T. Vought, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies: Implementation of Executive Order 13,924, OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET (June 9, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
M-20-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD7M-RWCM]. Agencies were given two weeks to 
complete these tasks. Id. 
Much of the engagement, to date, with Exec. Order No. 13924, including 
OMB’s most substantial guidance, has focused on enforcement discretion as 
opposed to rulemaking. Paul Ray, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretaries of 
Executive Departments and Agencies: Implementation of Section 6 of Executive 
Order 13924, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-20-31.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9B48-BP8V].            
25. Moreover, there are only a handful of references to Exec. Order No. 
13924 in the Federal Register and none of them invokes retrospective review. Each 
of the surfaced examples represented a rollback or delay in compliance 
requirements, but none of them referenced the part of Exec. Order No. 13924 that 
deals with retrospective review of temporary rollbacks. See, e.g., Safety Standard 
for Hand-Held Infant Carriers, 85 Fed. Reg. 46000 (July 31, 2020) (Consumer 
Safety Protection Commission delayed the effective date for a new rule regarding 
hand-held infant carriers to the end of the calendar year); Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles, 
85 Fed. Reg. 54273 (Sept. 1, 2020) (National Highway Traffic and Safety 
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regulatory rollbacks, both before and after the release of E.O. 13,924, the 
retrospective review process recommended by the Executive Order has not 
yet manifested in a clear way.26  
B.  HHS Case Study 
Historically, under the Obama Administration, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) provided robust accounts of its 
retrospective review process.27 HHS committed to a retrospective review 
effort as part of its “Regulatory Reform and Simplification” goal laid out in 
its most recent strategic plan, covering 2018-22.28 Under the Trump 
 
Administration delayed the effective date for vehicle safety standards and 
minimum sound requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles by six months, in 
response to a petition); Medicare Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 50074, 50119–200 (Aug. 
17, 2020) (Centers for Medicare/Medicaid Services (CMS), in a proposed 
rulemaking regarding CY 2021 Revisions to Payment Policies, sought comment on 
whether it would be advantageous to allow practitioners to bill and be paid based 
on shorter monitoring periods than historically available, when using remote 
physiologic monitoring (RPM). CMS requested these comments in line with Exec. 
Order No. 13924’s urging for deregulatory actions.); Policy Statement on 
Passenger Vessel Financial Responsibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 49600, 49600 (Aug. 14, 
2020) (Federal Maritime Commission published a policy statement “to provide 
guidance on possible regulatory relief with respect to COVID-19’s unprecedented 
economic effects to passenger vessel operators”; in particular, the policy offers 
alternatives to evaluating passenger vessel operators’ financial responsibility 
related to “nonperformance of transportation and death or injury to passengers.”); 
Limited Extension of Relief for Certain Persons and Operations During the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 
38763 (June 29, 2020) (The Federal Aviation Administration and Department of 
Transportation extended additional relief to flight operators, waiving “certain 
training, recent experience, testing, and checking requirements.”).  
26. Similarly, the EPA rolled back enforcement of many environmental 
standards for the first several months of the crisis. COVID-19 Enforcement and 
Compliance Resources, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/covid-19-
enforcement-and-compliance-resources [https://perma.cc/SY2J-G63F] (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2020). These are precisely the types of rescissions that could eventually 
lead to a re-examination of pre-COVID practices and, consequently, future 
deregulatory rulemakings.  
27. HHS was already actively engaged in retrospective review prior to Obama 
E.O. 13,563, based on requirements from the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
congressional appropriations, changes in “technology, new data or other 
information, or legislative change” and in response to rulemaking petitions. See 
Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Preliminary Regulatory Reform Plan at 5 OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET (May 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira
/regulation-reform [https://perma.cc/6C9E-U7LP] (also describing revisions HHS 
has made in response to retrospective review activities). 
28. See Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Overview: 
HHS Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. 
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Administration, HHS touted itself as the “top agency for regulatory reform” 
and the “top federal agency in reducing regulatory burden.”29 It also 
emerged as a federal agency leader in experimenting with AI. This section 
compares and contrasts the “old-fashioned” approach to retrospective 
review under both the Obama and Trump Administrations to the more 
recent “AI for deregulation” approach taken up under the Trump 
Administration. 
1.  The “Old-Fashioned” Approach 
Under the Obama Administration, HHS provided a robust 
description of its approach to identifying regulations for retrospective 
review, which encompassed several steps.30 First (as is typical across most 
Obama era agencies’ retrospective review plans), the agency would take 
inventory of all existing significant regulations, including information on 
when the regulation was originally promulgated, its most recent 
modification, and the reason for the modification. More specifically, each 
agency within HHS would develop a list to review over the subsequent two-
year period, identifying significant regulations that had been operational for 
at least five years since originally promulgated and not yet reviewed. 
Second (again consistent with the factors flagged across agency plans), 
agencies within HHS incorporated public comments and feedback on which 
regulations would be good candidates for retrospective review, including 
(somewhat more expansively than other agencies) by examining past 
comments from town hall meetings, public comments, and internet portals. 
Next, each agency prioritized regulations to review, beginning with 
regulations that “agencies can easily modify, streamline, or rescind” and 
 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/strategic-plan/overview/index.html#
overview [https://perma.cc/TBG2-7ERD]. Every four years, HHS updates its 
strategic plan in conformance with the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1933 and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Pub. L. 103-62 and 
Pub. L. 111-352, respectively. Id. HHS laid out five departmental strategic goals: 
(1) Reform, Strengthen, and Modernize the Nation’s Healthcare System; (2) Protect 
the Health of Americans Where They Live, Learn, Work, and Play; (3) Strengthen 
the Economic and Social Well-being of Americans Across the Lifespan; (4) Foster 
Sound, Sustained Advances in the Sciences; and (5) Promote Effective and 
Efficient Management and Stewardship. Id. This last goal, and more particularly its 
subtheme titled “Regulatory Reform and Simplification,” houses HHS’s 
retrospective review effort. Id.  
29. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 43 
(2019) [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT]. HHS measured its success through 
reducing the present-value economic burden of its regulations by $11.4 billion and 
touting making forty-six “deregulatory actions” compared with eighteen 
“regulatory actions.” Id. 
30. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING RULES 4–5 (May 18, 2011).  
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then proceeding to consider remaining regulations in accordance with the 
goal of developing a “streamlined, robust, and balanced regulatory 
framework.”31   
Delving more into the precise targeted features of regulations 
signaling ripeness for review, HHS urged agencies to identify regulations 
that required updating in light of changing technology. HHS also urged 
agencies to focus on reducing reporting and record-keeping burdens and to 
eliminate outdated provisions.32 In a similar vein, HHS encouraged 
agencies to determine whether the regulation was meeting its objectives or, 
more specifically, to consider whether it could be replaced with a “less 
proscriptive” activity.33 In line with this, agencies were asked to identify 
regulations that could be replaced with guidance, incentives, public 
disclosure, or other non-regulatory measures. Finally, HHS urged its 
agencies to evaluate whether the regulation was effective.34 Specifically, 
HHS aimed to move towards incorporating evaluations within its 
regulations.35  
The July 2015 update from HHS outlined the progress made on the 
retrospective review of twelve regulations, which sheds light on the types of 
regulations undergoing modification.36 For example, in the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, HHS increased 
transparency in reimbursement proceedings. HHS credited its success to 
public comments and economic analysis, reporting an annual savings from 
the final rule of $240 million as compared to the prior rule.37 Another 
example is the Head Start Performance Standards, which updated 15-year 
old education standards as required by the Improving Head Start for School 
Readiness Act of 2007.38 HHS reduced the number of requirements by 40% 
 
31. Id. at 4.  
32. HHS provided additional information on some of their previous successful 
uses of retrospective review. Id. at app. B. Rationales that HHS used to identify 
regulations (79) for retrospective review: of the twenty-three “department-wide” 
initiatives, the vast majority of regulations were justified based on changes in 
circumstances or technology (13), followed by efforts to reduce paperwork (7), and 
“clean up” or eliminate outdated provisions (3). Id. Other regulations, however, 
were simply identified as agency priorities without additional information. Id. 
33. Id. at 4.  
34. Id. 
35. For example, the Graphic Warning labels on Cigarette Packs included a 
mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the labels. See FDA Proposes New 




36. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS RETROSPECTIVE 
REVIEW UPDATE 1 (July 2015).  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
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and reorganized for clarity. HHS cited “extensive consultation with 
researchers, practitioners . . . and other experts.”39 Aside from these rules 
and proposed rules, HHS noted several anticipated regulatory activities.40 A 
year later, the July 2016 report described 61 regulations that had been 
flagged for retrospective review.41 HHS pointed to the role of public 
comments and conversations with stakeholders in modifying these 
regulations as well as changed circumstances and outdatedness of a rule. 
HHS does not have retrospective review reports after 2016 and, as 
mentioned above, the Trump Administration E.O. 13,771 did not require 
agencies to publish reports.42 HHS did, however, provide some information 
about the progress of its RRTF and its deregulatory actions under E.O. 
13,771. In particular, HHS identified 126 potential deregulatory actions in 
2018 and 2019—far more than the agency could implement.43 The 
characteristics tracked by HHS incorporated comments from public input 
and peer review, showing some consistency with earlier aims of 
retrospective review.44 As of 2018, HHS estimated its recent regulatory 
reforms would reduce paperwork by 53 million hours and save $5.2 
billion.45 
 
39. Id. Other examples include: (1) Reform of Requirements for Long-Term 
Care Facilities, a proposed rule that revised the requirements for Long-Term Care 
facilities, with an aim of increasing flexibility in care provisions; HHS again cited 
public comment and industry feedback. Id. at 2; (2) Veterinary Feed Directives rule 
that streamlined certain veterinary processes and claimed a more cost-effective 
regulatory program, leading to annual savings of $7.87 million. Id.; (3) Medicaid 
Managed Care, proposed rule developed through public comment, on-the-ground 
feedback from state partners, “aligns” Medicaid rules with other major health 
coverage rules (such as Qualified Health Plans and Medicare Advantage Plans). Id. 
at 3. 
40. See id. at 3–10.  
41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS JULY 2016 
RETROSPECTIVE REPORT (July 2016). Of the flagged rules, twenty-six were 
“completed,” four were “new” (e.g. they had not previously been included in a 
retrospective analysis update), and the remainder were ongoing. Id.  
42. See Retrospective Review of Existing Rules, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/open/retrospective-review/
index.html [https://perma.cc/29NW-4L6W]; Exec. Order 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 
9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).  
43. Office of Budget, FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan and Report - 




45. Secretary Azar Highlights Recognition of HHS as Top Agency for 
Regulatory Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/17/secretary-azar-highlights-recognition-
of-hhs-as-top-agency-for-regulatory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/NP4J-3366].  
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Beyond this, HHS’s regulatory agenda lends further insight. The 
preamble to the regulatory agenda for FY2019 covers a wide array of both 
regulatory and deregulatory actions; however, it does not clearly tie in 
elements of retrospective review.46 Some deregulatory actions are justified 
based on “additional flexibilit[y],”47 “clearer federal guidance,”48 and a 
reduction in “burdensome and costly regulations.”49 However, a closer look 
shows that HHS targeted the Affordable Care Act’s nondiscrimination 
requirements (which it justified based on Paperwork Reduction Act 
requirements), revised regulations to limit “burdens on religious freedom 
and conscience,” and took steps to address “the failings of the Affordable 
Care Act.”50 It is thus difficult to discern whether HHS’s retrospective 
review-based justifications or, instead, more overtly political justifications 
were the actual driving forces behind the deregulatory actions. 
It is not yet clear, moreover, how much progress HHS made with 
respect to its COVID-19 centered deregulatory retrospective review. For 
example, HHS allowed a large telehealth expansion in April 2020—a 
month before E.O. 13,924 was issued.51 That expansion was tied to a 
relaxation of the enforcement of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) standards, allowing doctors to use platforms, 
such as Skype and FaceTime, that are not HIPPA compliant.52 HHS has not 
yet issued a rulemaking or guidance document regarding any permanent 
changes.53 
Finally, on November 4, 2020, HHS published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking, “Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations 
Timely,” that would automatically sunset regulations after 10 years in order 
 
46. Statement of Regulatory Priorities for Fiscal Year 2020, OFF. OF INFO. 
AND REG. AFF. 1 (last visited May 11, 2020), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/e
Agenda/StaticContent/201910/Statement_0900_HHS.pdf [https://perma.cc/U54Q-
YGHH].  
47. Id. at 2. 
48. Id. at 2–3.  
49. Id. at 3.  
50. Id. at 2, 3, 8. 
51. See Council of Economic Advisers, Deregulation Sparks Dramatic 
Telehealth Increase During the COVID-19 Response, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 28, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/deregulation-sparks-dramatic-tele
health-increase-covid-19-response/ [https://perma.cc/6RRZ-UZZF].  
52. Id. 
53. See Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA), Telehealth: Delivering 
Care Safely During Covid-19, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (July 15, 
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/telehealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/A
Y7N-6Y7G]. While the Federal Communications Commission has issued funding 
to expand telehealth, that funding was released prior to HHS enacting the 
enforcement discretion guidance and well before Exec. Order 13294. See 
Promoting Telehealth for Low-Income Consumers; COVID-19 Telehealth 
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 19892 (Apr. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 54). 
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“to incentivize periodical retrospective review.”54 According to HHS, “one 
of the most important factors for ensuring agencies conduct retrospective 
reviews of their regulations is to provide for the sunset or automatic 
expiration of certain regulatory requirements after a period of time unless a 
retrospective review determines that the regulations should be 
maintained.”55 In essence, this rule would invert the baseline for 
retrospective review in a dramatically deregulatory direction—rather than 
the agency selecting regulations to modify or rescind, an agency must select 
a regulation for review in order for the regulation to continue in force. The 
final version of this rule was promulgated on January 19, 2021, and gave 
HHS an additional five years to review any rules that are overdue for 
retrospective review under the sunset provision.56 
HHS’s version of regulatory reform in response to E.O. 13,771 and 
13,777 consistently emphasized its outsized number of “deregulatory 
actions and negative net cost” of all its actions. It is against this backdrop 
that we next consider its pilot project of introducing AI-driven technologies 
into its retrospective review process—which it has dubbed “AI for 
Deregulation.”57 
2.  “AI for Deregulation” 
The Trump Administration’s deregulatory thrust, injected into the 
old-fashioned retrospective review approach continued from the Obama 
Administration, is a solid pillar in the HHS “AI for Deregulation” strategy. 
Where AI meets retrospective review, the Trump Administration has urged, 
across the board, that “[i]n conducting such retrospective reviews, agencies 
 
54. The NPRM imposed automatic expiration of all regulations “at the end of 
(1) two calendar years after the year that this proposed rule first becomes effective, 
(2) ten calendar years after the year of the regulation’s promulgation, or (3) ten 
calendar years after the last year in which the Department assessed and, if required, 
reviewed the regulation, whichever is latest.” Securing Updated and Necessary 
Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70097 (Nov. 4, 2020).   
55. Id.  
56. The Final Rule stated: 
HHS finalizes this rule to provide that, subject to certain 
exceptions, all regulations issued by the Secretary or his 
delegates or sub-delegates . . . shall expire at the end of (1) five 
calendar years after the year that this final rule first becomes 
effective, (2) ten calendar years after the year of the Section’s 
promulgation, or (3) ten calendar years after the last year in 
which the Department Assessed and, if required, Reviewed the 
Section, whichever is latest.  
See Final Rule: Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 86 
Fed. Reg. 5694 (Jan. 19, 2021) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 200, 300, 403, 
1010, and 1390). 
57. Keckler, supra note 8; Chappellet-Lanier, supra note 8.  
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can determine whether regulatory changes are necessary to remove barriers 
to the adoption of net beneficial AI systems by identifying and 
promulgating deregulatory actions, consistent with Executive Orders 
13771, ‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,’ and 
13777, ‘Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda.’”58 The Trump 
Administration thereby wielded AI as yet another potential motivator for its 
broader deregulatory agenda.59  
As mentioned at the outset, HHS pioneered the first rule to 
incorporate AI-driven technologies.60 In its “Regulatory Clean Up 
Initiative” final rule (published on November 16, 2020), HHS described its 
pilot program using a new method of regulatory analysis, “an AI-driven 
tool that analyzed HHS’s regulations using NLP as applied to the regulatory 
text in the CFR.”61 As HHS explained: 
This NLP analysis is designed to accelerate and augment 
expert review, by highlighting “candidate” provisions that 
could be outmoded, allowing HHS SMEs to focus on these 
provisions as potential areas of opportunity for 
modernization. The NLP analysis revealed numerous 
reform opportunities, including instances where a 
regulation citation is now incorrect. Combined with the 
policy expertise of HHS SMEs, this NLP analysis method 
has yielded promising results towards reforming and 
modernizing regulations at HHS.62  
HHS’s rule was released without much fanfare and without much 
foreshadowing—notwithstanding the fact that it emerged out of a years-
long pilot project within HHS to deploy artificial intelligence in 
retrospective review.63 At the September 2019 White House Summit on 
Artificial Intelligence in Government, the HHS Deputy Secretary presented 
 
58. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 11 (referencing Exec. Order No. 13771, 
Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339) (Jan. 
30, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.p
df [https://perma.cc/P2VW-M6HD]; Exec. Order No. 13777, Enforcing the 
Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZH6-8SER].  
59. The unexplored underlying assumption here is that regulations actually 
impede agencies’ ability to adopt AI systems. 
60. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020).  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Launches First-of-its-Kind 
Regulatory Clean-Up Initiative Utilizing AI, HHS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/11/17/hhs-launches-first-its-kind-
regulatory-clean-up-initiative-utilizing-ai.html [https://perma.cc/4RY5-X4HY].  
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AI for Deregulation which laid out a few of its findings based on the pilot 
project underway: 85% of HHS regulations created before 1990 had not 
been edited; HHS had nearly 300 broken citation references in the CFR; 
there were more than fifty instances of triplicate reporting requirements; 
and there were 114 parts in the CFR with no regulatory entity listed.64 At 
that time, in terms of prioritizing ways for technology to accelerate 
regulatory reform HHS ranked, as first, “identifying potentially outdated 
regulations.”65 Despite this, scouring the publicly available HHS annual 
reports and budget proposals, only a few references to this innovative AI 
use case surfaced. HHS debuted the use of AI in regulatory reform in its 
2019 Annual Report (released on February 2, 2020).66 The Deputy 
Secretary’s Office initiated an experimental AI-enabled review of all HHS 
regulations that identified “hundreds of technical errors and over 50 
opportunities to remove paperwork submission requirements – especially 
outdated requirements like faxes.”67 
The 2021 Budget (published only 18 days later), confirmed these 
modest ambitions for AI, but also left the door open for more ambitious 
uses of AI to “modernize regulations.”68 HHS allocated an $8 million 
 
64. Keckler, supra note 8; Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory 
Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70101–02 (Nov. 4, 2020). 
65. Id.  
66. With regard to the use of AI outside of its regulatory reform effort, HHS 
mentioned the following: (1) use of AI in its “Buy Smarter” initiative for 
acquisitions of goods and services. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 44, 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2019-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ
K4-5L5X]; (2) an FDA plan to make a more “digital, traceable, and safer food 
system” through sensor networks, blockchain, and AI. Id. at 32; (3) setting up a 
neural net to speed up analysis of security data through the OCIO. Id. at 46; and (4) 
a collaboration with industry to use AI to match patients with clinical trials through 
the CTO. Id.  
 HHS’ 2018 Annual Report likewise contained a few references to the use 
of AI.  U.S. DEP’T OF HHS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WCP-55YY]. The 
HHS CTO focused on leveraging AI to “improv[e] experimental therapy, matching 
clinical trials, and responding to Lyme disease.” Id. at 24. AI’s use is flagged in 
ReImagine HHS’s “Buy Smarter” effort to improve acquisitions of goods and 
services. Id. at 40 (mentioning the development of a “secure, immutable automated 
data layer to provide the HHS workforce with real-time, agency-wide data for 
effective decision making throughout the acquisition process”). However, there 
was no mention of AI with regard to deregulation or regulatory review and 
simplification. Nor was it mentioned in adjacent sections on “Building Budgetary 
and Operational Excellence” or “Maximizing the Promise of Data.” 
67. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 43.  
68. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF 13 
(content last reviewed Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF].  
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budget increase to support the agency-wide AI strategy.69 As part of its 
“regulatory reduction” effort, HHS “used an Artificial Intelligence-driven 
regulation analysis tool and expert insight to analyze the Code of Federal 
Regulations, seeking potential opportunities to modernize regulations.”70 
The 2021 budget describes the AI’s function as “reviewing and—where a 
change is warranted— . . . addressing incorrect citations and eliminating the 
submission of triplicate or quadruplicate of the same citation.”71 
II.  THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AI FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 
The use of AI-driven technologies holds enormous promise to 
revolutionize the process of retrospective review; at the same time, it poses 
challenges and sheds new light on addressing conventionally framed threats 
to the administrative state such as transparency and democratic 
accountability.72  
From a good governance standpoint, AI could dramatically 
improve the existing manual, labor-intensive process by which agencies 
sort through regulations for retrospective review. One could imagine a 
rulemaking that sets up an automated search process that uses some 
algorithm to propose rules for review.73 AI technologies could assist in 
identifying variables that may have predictive power for whether or not an 
agency would consider a regulation to be ripe for retrospective review. To 
begin, the technologies can vastly enhance the efficiency of sorting based 
on pre-defined criteria. For example, regulations that are legally binding 
(and can be tagged based upon language such as “shall” or “must”) are 
 
69. The 2021 Budget referenced several uses of AI at several agencies and 
departments within HHS: (1) FDA: import screening; review of adverse event 
reports; identification of potential problems associated with chronic consumption 
of food constituents and contaminants, and promote AI medical devices. Id. at 25; 
(2) NIH: deepen understanding of underlying causes of chronic diseases and 
identify successful early treatments. Id. at 58 (The budget provides $50 million to 
utilize AI in this effort.); (3) Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS): 
rapid review of chart documentation to improve payment accuracy to reduce 
improper payments, prevent fraud, and target bad actors regarding Medicare. Id. at 
99; also, to predict unplanned hospital admissions and adverse events. Id. at 133; 
(4) Administration for Community Living (ACL): in-home AI “to facilitate 
communication and food-ordering and increase knowledge and self-management of 
chronic diseases to reduce hospitalizations.” Id. at 161. 
70. FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 68, at 13. 
71. Id. at 13–14.  
72. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 1. 
73. This could also avoid some of the classic problems with retrospective 
analysis—namely that the agencies charged with retrospective review are expected 
to criticize their own work. So taking their hands off might help facilitate and 
legitimate the selection of rules for review. I thank Mike Livermore for this insight. 
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promising candidates in terms of narrowing the relevant domain to 
regulations most likely to impact the regulatory environment.74 
Historically, with regard to “old-fashioned” retrospective review, 
federal agencies responded to democratic pressure when formulating their 
respective agendas and in deciding whether and how to revise rules.  The 
introduction of AI tools into this process might give the impression that 
neutral principles flag regulations that are due to be revisited via a 
predictive, supervised learning approach. If that is so, then agencies should 
be able to justify and defend how such tools are deployed.  Agencies, 
moreover, should explain how they identify a suitable training data set of 
regulations to refine the operative algorithms.75  Here is where disclosure, 
public participation, and oversight are key to guard against some of the 
perils of the use of AI.  
The Institute of Policy Integrity (IPI) at NYU School of Law 
promulgated some guiding principles for retrospective review in 2011 
(prior to any emphatically pro-regulatory or pro-deregulatory stance from 
the White House).76 Many of the agency retrospective review plans 
described above referenced IPI’s guidelines.77 Particularly relevant to the 
analysis here, IPI cautioned that retrospective reviews should avoid both 
deregulatory and pro-regulatory biases and should instead calibrate 
regulatory programs for improved efficiency and effectiveness.78    
 
74. This is included in the functionality of RegData (discussed infra Section 
II.A.1). 
75. Consider a dataset of regulations labeled “0” or “1” that is used to train 
supervised learning algorithms used to target regulations for retrospective review.  
Without information about the labeling process—for example, is it the result of a 
political process within the agency to target certain sectors, or turned over to 
industry rating systems—it is difficult to evaluate the process. 
76. See Institute for Policy Integrity, Comments on Reducing Regulatory 
Burden: Retrospective Review Under Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 10526 
(Mar. 28, 2011), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy_Integrity_Comments
_on_DOI_Retrospective_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHM2-C96D]. 
Retrospective review is not given much attention in IPI’s 2020 Transition 
Guidance, although IPI does advocate removing some of the distortions of the 
regulatory review process, such as the “two-for-one” rule. See Jason A. Schwartz, 
Enhancing the Social Benefits of Regulatory Review, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY 
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., 6 (Oct. 2020),  https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/
Enhancing_the_Social_Benefits_of_Regulatory_Review.pdf. 
77. See, e.g., Dep’t of Def. Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing Rules, 
4 (Aug. 18, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/
2011-regulatory-action-plans/departmentofdefenseregulatoryreformplanaugust2011
a.pdf; Dep’t of State Final Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing Rules, 4 
(Aug. 17, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/201
1-regulatory-action-plans/departmentofstateregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf.  
78. With this goal of fostering unbiased and independent retrospective 
analysis of existing rules, IPI recommended that agencies appoint a review team of 
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A.  Existing AI Tools Harnessed for Deregulatory Aims 
This section explores pilot retrospective review projects utilizing 
two AI tools.  The first, RegData, is a tool incorporating AI technologies 
that has been exploited by the Mercatus Center in furtherance of an explicit 
deregulatory agenda. It was used as part of a model that claimed that the 
United States could have an economy 25 percent larger if there had been no 
new regulations between the 1970s and today.79 A later generation of 
RegData was used in comments supporting the HHS Sunset Provision rule 
(discussed above).80 Scholars have “call[ed] into question prevailing 
accounts that have relied exclusively on the quantification of regulatory 
obligations” without giving due regard to offsetting benefits.81 
RegExplorer, another tool incorporating AI technologies, has been 
used by a number of state and federal governments to assist in retrospective 
regulatory review. Deloitte initially piloted RegExplorer with the Canadian 
federal government to identify the average age of regulations, the amount of 
time elapsed since being updated, and semantic trends in regulatory 
prescriptiveness.82 To date, its applications seem to reflect a deregulatory 
bent. At the state level, Ohio recently used RegExplorer to identify and 
eliminate rules that, per the algorithm’s determination, were redundant and 
burdensome.83 And overseas, the Australian state of New South Wales 
 
personnel separate from the authors of the initial rule.  With regard to targeting 
rules to review, IPI urged agencies to adopt clear and publicly available guidelines 
for how they select rules ripe for review. Once selected, the retrospective analysis 
should include a thorough and balanced review of a rule’s impact, including costs 
and benefits as well as distributional effects. 
79. Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, & Pietro Peretto, The Cumulative 
Cost of Regulations (Mercatus Working Paper), https://www.mercatus.org/system/
files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf.  The model is developed in a one-sided 
framework that considers costs (How restrictive is the rule? How complicated is the 
rule? How many rules are there?) but ignores benefits.  
80. James Broughel & Kofi Ampaabeng, HHS’s Innovative New Sunset 
Regulation (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/hhs%
E2%80%99s-innovative-new-sunset-regulation. 
81. Cary Coglianese et al., Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 1, 25), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=37018
41.  
82. Craig Alexander and Aisha Ansari, Making Regulation a Competitive 
Advantage 32, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/
Documents/finance/ca-en-making-regulation-comp-advantage-pov-aoda-v2.pdf. 
83. Allen Bernard, Ohio using AI to cull old laws and streamline regulations, 
TECHREPUBLIC (June 25, 2020), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ohio-using-
ai-to-cull-old-laws-and-streamline-regulations/.  Beyond merely flagging duplicate 
rules, RegExplorer helped Ohio identify “how many functions in state government 
require [people] to show up at a state office or fill out a form,” which the 
government then used as a proxy for burden. Id. 
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(NSW) also used RegExplorer to zero in on burdensome, onerous, or 
outdated regulations.  AI was used to help identify prescriptive or onerous 
text that, for example, included words such as “shall,” “must,” “cannot,” or 
“ought” (similar to RegData’s restrictions keyword metric).84 RegExplorer 
also assisted in flagging paper-based procedural compliance activities, such 
as publications of notices in newspapers, witnesses in person, or oaths, as a 
proxy for “overly burdensome.”85  
1.  RegData  
RegData includes a digitized domain of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, the State Administrative Codes for 46 states plus the District 
of Columbia, and Administrative Codes for Canada and Australia.86 
RegData uses textual analysis to classify regulatory text by industry (by 
NAICS [North American Industry Classification System] code), link 
regulatory text to the implementing agency, and examine trends over time 
in restrictive regulations.87 The Mercatus authors “use machine-learning 
text-classification algorithms to predict which industry is primarily affected 
by each obligation-imposing term.”88 
The innovative Mercatus study used RegData to conduct 
retrospective review in Canada.89 The authors primarily focused on the 
linguistic complexity of regulations in order to categorize those due for 
 
84. REGULATING FOR NSW’S FUTURE, NSW TREASURY 4 (July 2020), 
https://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-07/FINAL%20Treasury%
20report%20210720.pdf. 
85. Id. at 9–10. 
86. See generally RegData US Technical Documentation, QUANTGOV, 
https://www.quantgov.org/regdata-us-documentation [https://perma.cc/34D9-7LP
R]; State RegData, QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/state-regdata 
[https://perma.cc/7RS3-QJ8E]; RegData Canada, QUANTGOV, https://www.quant
gov.org/regdata-canada [https://perma.cc/5S3Z-6YRY]; RegData Australia, 
QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/regdata-australia [https://perma.cc/4H3B-7
THE] (discussing the sources of information which are contained in RegData 
projects). 
87. Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical 
Database on Industry-specific Regulations for All US Industries and Federal 
Regulations, 1997-2012 4, 15, 17, 21, 38 (Mercatus Center, Working Paper, 2014), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/McLaughlin-RegData.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WT49-67ST]. 
88. Coglianese et al., supra note 81. 
89. See generally Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData Canada: A Data-Driven 
Approach to Regulatory Reform 1 (Mercatus Center, Policy Brief, 2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-analysis/regdata-canada-data-
driven-approach-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/6CUT-3QWM] (discussing 
the RegData Canada project). 
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review.90 The authors posited that linguistically complex regulations place 
an additional time and cost burden on regulated entities by requiring more 
time to read and understand, and, due to the complexity, likely increasing 
the number of attorneys needed for compliance.91 
The study proposed several metrics for targeting regulations for 
retrospective review. First, they considered sentence length.92 In Canada, 
the Treasury recommends that regulations have twenty words or less per 
sentence.93 The authors thus argued that regulations with longer sentences 
should be subject to review or the sentences broken down. Second, the 
study relied on a metric called “Shannon Entropy” which is used to measure 
the rate at which new ideas are added to text.94 Shakespeare typically scores 
between 9.0-9.7;95 the researchers suggested using the Shakespeare score as 
a cutoff for review.96 
While reducing complexity could certainly enhance readability, it 
would not necessarily target regulations that are outdated. The AI-driven 
technologies, moreover, are harnessed in an explicitly deregulatory fashion. 
As Cary Coglianese and co-authors point out, RegData does not account for 
“unrules” within regulatory text, which serve to alleviate obligations on 
covered entities.97 This imbalanced focus on restrictive terms (obligations), 
without noting the exceptions and exemptions, could cause a retrospective 
AI tool to flag certain regulatory texts as overly burdensome or costly 
when, in reality, the costs may be far below what the number of 
“restriction” terms would suggest. In other words, agency use of the 
RegData tools would likely target a high proportion of false positives (i.e., 
designating a rule as overly burdensome or costly when it in fact embeds 
pressure valves).98  
 
90. See id.  
91. Id. at 4–5.  




96. Id. at 5–6.  
97. Coglianese et al., supra note 81. More explicitly: “[the RegData authors] 
have used their results showing a nearly 20 percent increase in obligation-related 
words since 1997 to caution against adding further regulation, claiming that 
‘regulatory accumulation will continue to stifle economic growth.’ But the 
Mercatus Center research does not take account of unrules.” Id. at 24–25. 
Coglianese’s point is that “government regulation is far less onerous – and far more 
flexible – than previously imagined” by Mercatus and others who use an 
exclusively one-sided test. Id. at 3. Therefore, “[a] regulatory system can only be 
understood as the net effects of both its rules and its unrules.” Id. 
98. To remedy this issue, Coglianese et al. replicate the Mercatus Institute’s 
methodology but expand the analysis to include obligation-alleviating terms such 
as “waive,” “exempt,” or “exclude.” Comparing the ratio of obligation-imposing 
and obligation-alleviating terms in CFR Titles labeled “Food & Drugs” and “Public 
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Weighting an AI tool to minimize false negatives at the expense of 
a higher false positive rate (like the above would suggest) better serves a 
deregulatory agenda. Successful pursuit of a deregulatory agenda, however, 
is conditional on the AI tool’s ability to estimate accurately the average cost 
or burden of a rule (or component within a rule). RegData would seem to 
come up short here, given its reliance on rather crude proxies.99 Partisan 
(and nonpartisan) agendas for retrospective review would be better served 
by employing precise parameters in an AI-leveraged regulatory analysis—
which leads us directly to the AI-driven tool known as RegExplorer. 
2.  RegExplorer 
Deloitte’s RegExplorer, like RegData, runs on a domain of 
digitized federal and state regulations (as well as several foreign 
countries).100 It can view a regulation’s text in a machine-readable format 
and discover how agencies regulate certain terms via its “Search” function. 
It can also understand certain things about a given regulation, such as the 
types of topics (“sub-topics”) the regulation discusses (e.g., “electrical and 
nuclear industries”). AI is used to identify (within a particular confidence 
interval) which topics are discussed by a given section of regulatory text. 
Not only is the functionality of RegExplorer more sophisticated 
than RegData, it is also more user-friendly. It is organized by tabs with 
specific functions, all of which can be visualized through a dashboard. The 
“Research” tab allows searching by the year of a regulation’s last edit and 
the age of the regulation. The “Analyze” tab maps cross-references made by 
a given part of a regulation to other parts of the CFR. Finally, the 
“Compare” tab facilitates the search for regulatory overlap (i.e., do Reg A 
and Reg B discuss the same things?).  
AI tools may be particularly effective in terms of searching for 
overlapping regulatory areas. AI technologies are used to determine 
whether two agencies regulate the same topic areas.101 They can help to 
 
Health,” for instance, the authors find a ratio of one obligation-alleviating term for 
every 4.5 obligation-imposing words. This ratio was ranked the tenth and eleventh 
most alleviating out of the 49 observed CFR Titles. Id. at 32. However, a high 
alleviation-to-obligation ratio does not necessarily indicate more deregulation. For 
one, it neglects to account for the deregulatory power of a given word in the 
context of a rule or set of obligations. 
99. Imprecision, moreover, decreases transparency in the process and in the 
effects, further shrouding a potentially black box in opacity. 
100. DELOITTE, REGEXPLORER, https://www.regulatoryexplorer.com (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
101. More specifically, neural networks were deployed to create topic clusters 
of the CFR. See Daniel Byler, Beth Flores & Jason Lewis, Using Advanced 
Analytics to Drive Regulatory Reform 8, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/public-sector/us-ps-using-advanced-analytics-
396 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 374 
build classification schemes linking text in the regulation to a particular 
agency and industry. Whereas RegData has classifications linking text to 
industry and agencies, the RegExplorer “Compare” function is much more 
sophisticated. Such technologies can be used effectively to identify 
regulations on similar topic areas directed at the same industry as 
candidates for streamlining.  
B.  Future AI Tools Harnessed for Increased Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
Looking to the future use of AI tools in the realm of retrospective 
review, it is imperative for good governance aims to consider not only 
factors that could predict regulations that have out-lived their usefulness, 
but also those that could predict that a given regulation is outdated as a 
result of being under-protective. Notwithstanding the fact that the Trump 
Administration had an explicitly deregulatory agenda (as reflected in E.O. 
13,771102 and 13,924103)—and as touted in HHS’s articulation of its “AI for 
Deregulation” pilot104—the future use of AI-driven technologies in 
retrospective review should not serve as a one-way deregulatory ratchet.  
Academic commentators—and some pioneering agencies—have 
touted the use of AI to sift through voluminous comments in the notice-and-
comment informal rulemaking process.105 AI-driven NLP technologies 
 
to-drive-regulatory-reform.pdf.  The AI component identified close relationships 
between regulatory texts (e.g. that the regulation of “boats” and “fishing ship” 
share a common theme). After grouping CFR sections by topic, the tool produces 
certain summary statistics about the clusters that could indicate the need for 
updating, for instance, the difference in years between the oldest and youngest 
section in a cluster. Id. 
102. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).  
103. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 22, 2020).  
104. HHS Launches First-of-its-Kind Regulatory Clean-Up Initiative Utilizing 
AI, supra note 63; Keckler, supra note 8. 
105. See, e.g., Michael Livermore, Computationally Assisted Regulatory 
Participation 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1027, 1033–34 (2018) (discussing 
myriad benefits of leveraging NLP to help agencies sift through public comments, 
particularly for the benefit of enhancing “the efficacy of political review, akin to 
the role that cost-benefit analysis is thought to play by some commentators”); 
Engstrom et al., supra note 7, at 59-60 (describing how the FCC used AI/ML tools 
to identify duplicates, fake comments, and analyze sentiment in over twenty 
million comments responding to the proposed net neutrality rollback); Cary 
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making 
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1172 (“[I]t is hardly 
unimaginable today that agencies could automate entirely the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, especially for the kinds of routine rules that make up the bulk 
of government rules”); Cary Coglianese, A Framework for Governmental Use of 
Machine Learning, ADMIN CONF. OF THE U.S. REP. 33 (Dec. 8, 2020), 
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harnessed for retrospective review could, for example, (1) identify 
comments that flag rules (or portions of rules) as burdensome and (2) 
identify partisan valence with respect to a particular rule component by 
matching partisanship of organization to sentiment (in favor or against) the 
component or rule.106 With regard to searching for regulatory overlap, AI 
tools might also be used to identify regulations where a high proportion of 
comments name a topic heavily regulated by a different agency—as a 
predictor of overlapping regulatory areas.   
A potentially fruitful area for AI tools to exploit (which does not 
yet appear to be part of the functionality of the above-described tools or 
discussed in the academic literature) would be regulatory impact analyses. 
By Executive Order, all significant regulations must be accompanied by a 
cost-benefit analysis.107 Over time, certain elements of this cost-benefit 
analysis have changed. AI-driven technologies might identify comments 
that criticize the cost-benefit analysis as insufficient.   
Relatedly, an AI tool might specifically probe the value-of-a-
statistical life (VSL) methodology. There is no uniform VSL across 
agencies.108 Agencies independently choose how to calculate VSLs.109 
While, historically, agency VSLs have varied dramatically, more recently, 
agency VSL values coalesce in the range between $6 and $9 million.110 In 
2010, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set the 
VSL at $9.1 million—while considering placing a 50% premium on cancer 
deaths—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) used a VSL of $7.9 
million (increasing its 2008 estimate by over half), and the Department of 
 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Coglianese%20ACUS%20Fina
l%20Report.pdf (describing AI’s capacity to improve public engagement, and 
noting the CFPB’s efforts to incorporate AI to manage the “unprecedented volume” 
of comments and complaints from interested parties). 
106. While public commentary can and should continue to be a useful tool, 
given the lack of engagement, we may also want to consider using other data as a 
proxy for public sentiment. For example, Google Trends track the relative 
frequency of different search terms—it may be possible to discern which types of 
regulations are on the public’s mind. 
107. The content of these analyses is described in more detail in Circular A-4. 
Circular A-4, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ [https://perma.cc/8286-MD28]. 
108. In 2012, the Institute for Policy Integrity submitted comments to then-
OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein, urging that unifying the VSL across agencies 
should be a priority.  Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Public Comments: Recommendations 
to Promote Interagency Coordination (May 10, 2012) https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2012_cb/comments/ipi-interagency-
coordination-final-comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJL7-MMZ2]. 
109. Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
1423, 1437 (2014). 
110. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY 
STATE 94 (2014). 
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Transportation used a value of $6 million.111 A 2017 White House Report 
notes that only three agencies have issued guidance on VSL calculations, 
but that  “[i]n practice, agencies have tended to use a value above the mid-
point of” the range of VSL provided by Circular A-4.112 Agency VSLs are 
subject not only to substantial inter-agency variation, but also inter-
temporal variation. Estimates of VSL have increased dramatically over the 
past few decades, even after accounting for inflation. For example, the 
Department of Agriculture’s VSL was $3.6 million in 1994, but $8.9 
million by 2016.113 Similar increases have taken place in HHS, the FDA, 
and the EPA.114   
Regulations that use an outdated VSL estimate are at risk of under-
protecting public health.115 For example, considering the steep increase in 
the FDA’s VSL estimate between 2008 and 2011,116 it is possible that rules 
that were considered overly burdensome in prior administrations may no 
longer be sufficiently protective. Regulations promulgated without any 
cost-benefit analysis may also be at risk of being under-protective.117 
Livermore and Revesz explain this paradox in part by noting that, absent a 
cost-benefit analysis, industry may be able to influence the agency in a 
fashion not “exposed to the scrutiny of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”118 
Consequently, regulations devoid of a cost-benefit analysis may be ripe for 
retrospective review. 
 
111. Binyamin Appelbaum, As US. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, 
Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011) https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17
/business/economy/17regulation.html [https://perma.cc/596Z-LQ62]. 
112. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET: OFF. OF INFO. AND REG. AFF., EXEC. OFF. 
OF THE PRESIDENT, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED 
MANDATES REFORM ACT (2017). 
113. Dave Merrill, No One Values Your Life More Than the Federal 
Government, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2
017-value-of-life/ [https://perma.cc/8K89-XQ9Z]. 
114. Id.  
115. On a related note, there was a period wherein the EPA applied a “senior 
discount” to the VSL for older individuals. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. 
Aldy, Labor Market Estimates of the Senior Discount for the Value of Statistical 
Life, 53 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 377–78 (2007). This practice has since fallen 
out of favor. Merrill, supra note 112. It may well be that other agencies have had 
similar overhauls in their cost-benefit analyses—and AI tools could thereby assist 
in identifying. 
116. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based 
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1185–86 (2014). 
117. In Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, Livermore & 
Revesz find that the health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) have been set at levels that “are less stringent than those that would 
result from the application of a cost-benefit analysis.” Id. at 1258. 
118. Id. at 1247. 
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III.  GUARDRAILS FOR AI IN RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 
As AI-driven technologies are integrated into retrospective review 
or other rulemaking processes, it is critical that the uses align with 
underlying administrative law values of transparency, accountability, public 
participation, and oversight. The Trump Administration’s December 3, 
2020, “Executive Order on Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial 
Intelligence in the Federal Government”119 emphasized that “[t]he ongoing 
adoption and acceptance of AI will depend significantly on public trust.”120 
Agencies are therefore admonished to “design, develop, acquire, and use AI 
in a manner that fosters public trust and confidence.”121   
These general principles are relevant to the use of AI in 
retrospective review. Especially relevant are the Executive Order’s 
mandates that the AI be: (i) “[u]nderstandable” (“Agencies shall ensure that 
the operations and outcomes of their AI applications are sufficiently 
understandable by subject matter experts, users, and others, as 
appropriate.”);122 (ii) “[r]esponsible and traceable” (“The design, 
development, acquisition, and use of AI, as well as relevant inputs and 
outputs of particular AI applications, should be well documented and 
traceable, as appropriate and to the extent practicable.”);123 and (iii) 
“[t]ransparent” (“Agencies shall be transparent in disclosing relevant 
information regarding their use of AI to appropriate stakeholders, including 
the Congress and the public, to the extent practicable.”).124 
Transparency is key for meaningful public participation and 
oversight. As OMB has recognized, “[i]n addition to improving the 
rulemaking process, transparency and disclosure can increase public trust 
and confidence in AI applications by allowing (a) non-experts to understand 
how an AI application works and (b) technical experts to understand the 
process by which AI made a given decision.”125 
There is a burgeoning academic literature that discusses the 
promise and peril of AI, highlighting the administrative law values of 
transparency and reasons-giving.126 An intriguing emerging question is the 
 
119. Exec. Order No. 13960, 85 Fed. Reg. 78939, 78939 (Dec. 8, 2020).  
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 78940 § 3(e). 
123. Id. at § 3(f). 
124. Id. at § 3(h). 
125. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3. 
126. E.g., Coglianese, supra note 105, at 5-6 (arguing that the success of 
digital algorithms in a given use case will depend on certain preconditions, such as 
“a well-defined objective for repeated tasks for which there exist large quantities of 
data on outcomes and related correlates”); Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence 
Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399 (2017) (identifying a 
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extent to which AI algorithms are (or should be deemed) “rules” subject to 
the APA. Most commentators divide uses of AI technologies into those that 
“support” agency action—and therefore do not implicate the APA’s 
directives—and those that “determine” agency actions and thus should be 
subject to the full panoply of APA demands.127  
Such line-drawing exercises marking a definitive divide between 
“supportive” and “determinative” uses of AI technologies, however, may 
have unintended consequences. For example, they might provide a “safe 
harbor” (from notice-and-comment) to agency officials to pilot uses of 
“supportive” AI technologies. This is not bad per se, assuming the 
distinction is meaningful.  But it does critically overlook the possibility that 
the AI tool may over time gravitate over the line towards playing a more 
policy-relevant “determinative” role.  
The case study of HHS and its promulgation of the very first AI use 
in rulemaking—without even divulging its use of Deloitte’s RegExplorer 
AI tool—illustrates the potential peril. Several years into the HHS pilot, the 
tool has yet to be vetted through the NPRM process; indeed, little to no 
information about the tool has been provided to the public. While the tool 
purportedly played a decisively “supportive” role, it remains to be seen 
whether subsequent iterations will place the AI in a more “determinative” 
position.  Indeed, HHS was forthright with its determination to use AI in 
retrospective review to implement the Trump Administration’s deregulatory 
 
number of policy and institutional challenges posed by the application of AI to 
various topic areas). 
127. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 105, at 1170 (setting forth a 
spectrum of AI uses and hinging subjection of AI to APA §533 requirements on 
whether the AI is used in a supportive or determinative role in the decision-making 
process); Melissa Mortazavi, Rulemaking Ex Machina, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 202, 
209–10 (2017) (“[S]ome uses of automated technology in rulemaking might 
support agency action without violating the statutory requirements of the APA. For 
example, removing duplicate submissions, when truly identical, appears to save 
time with little substantive loss. This is a mechanical process, the equivalent of a 
keyword search, which is a fundamentally different process from using an 
automated analysis to sort comments based on fluid and adapting criteria.”). 
Cuéllar and Huq have a more nuanced conception, looking at “what [the AI 
systems] do” and in particular flagging uses that “embed a forward-looking policy” 
in its structure as subject to APA dictates. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. 
Huq, Toward the Democratic Regulation of AI Systems: A Prolegomenon (Univ. of 
Chi., Working Paper No. 753, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671011; see also 
David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the 
Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 800, 837 (2020) (“[T]he extent to which 
an algorithm binds will turn in significant part on the degree to which there is a 
human in the loop—a question that is itself a highly subjective one and also likely 
to change with informal shifts in agency practice.”). 
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agenda.128 The real promise of AI for retrospective review lies in the 
accountability and transparency behind how it works, so that when it 
inevitably gets leveraged in a political way, courts and the public can 
understand what is going on and react accordingly.   
A.  Disclosure and Soliciting Feedback on Retrospective Review Plans 
Pursuant to what I have deemed the “old fashioned approach,” 
agencies solicited public feedback on their retrospective review process. 
Under the Obama Administration, agencies published Final Retrospective 
Review Plans.129 Most agencies solicited feedback from the public as to 
regulations that they thought required retrospective review.130 Some noted, 
however, that this process did not result in a large number of comments. 
For example, the Office of Personnel Management received only three 
comments, none of which was actually related to the regulations the agency 
had flagged for initial review.131 Other agencies had more success with 
public outreach and also took a more direct approach to public engagement. 
The Department of Labor, in developing both its preliminary and final 
 
128. Chappellet-Lanier, supra note 8 (“Charles Keckler . . . shared the 
agency’s ‘AI for deregulation’ pilot. The project, which began one year ago, aims 
to use natural language processing to find HHS regulations that may be too 
burdensome, obsolete or ineffective. The end goal, after subject matter expert 
review, is to eliminate or change these regulations in order to streamline the HHS 
regulatory environment.”).   
129. All plans are available at: Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform [https://perma.c
c/PR93-RR5M].   
130. See, e.g., FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13656, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. at 3 (Aug. 18, 2011) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-
action-plans/departmentofagricultureregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf; PLAN 
FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RULES, DEP’T OF COM., 8–11 (Aug. 
18, 2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-
regulatory-action-plans/departmentofcommerceregulatoryreformplanaugust2011a.p
df (describing each Commerce’s bureau’s solicitation of feedback); ENV’T 
PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPROVING OUR REGULATIONS: FINAL PLAN FOR PERIODIC 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, 48–49 (Aug. 2011) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-
action-plans/environmentalprotectionagencyregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf 
(describing two comment periods yielding hundreds of written comments); DEP’T 
OF THE INTERIOR, PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REGULATORY REVIEW at 15–16, (Aug. 
2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulato
ry-action-plans/departmentoftheinteriorregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf.  
131. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
EXISTING RULES (Aug. 22, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/officeofpersonnelmanagement
regulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPZ2-SGSM]. 
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plans, created an interactive website; public engagement for the preliminary 
plan drew over 940 users and 113 individual recommendations, stimulating 
discussion and voting among users.132 The Social Security Administration 
successfully solicited over four hundred messages to its “RegsReview” 
email inbox—although most comments were unrelated to retrospective 
review—and contacted nine hundred stakeholders and individuals.133 Under 
the Trump Administration, HHS solicited comments to establish regular 
review cycles (e.g., every four or ten years) but noted concern that doing so 
could also result in a regulation being reviewed before industry has had the 
opportunity to fully adapt; as a result, effectiveness could be 
underestimated.134 
But there is a seemingly sharp break with regard to the “AI for 
Deregulation” plan. HHS did not publish, or otherwise make available to 
the public, any of its metrics and progress made through the Regulatory 
Review Task Forces. Moreover, in its first AI rulemaking, HHS explained 
that the changes to existing rules were not material enough on their face to 
warrant notice-and-comment. HHS would seem to be on firm ground—and 
supported by existing academic commentary—that its AI technologies 
played only a “supportive” role of the most mundane character. But this is 
only the first step of an increasingly technologically-leveraged program that 
is shrouded from public view and comment. Consider, for example, how the 
sheer number of unreviewed regulations subject to the automatic sunsetting 
provision would place increasing pressure on HHS to use an automated 
(and perhaps a less supportive and more determinative) approach to 
identifying and reviewing outmoded or overly burdensome regulations.135  
For this reason—and contra the existing literature—I argue that this process 
and the tool should also be subject to notice-and-comment. 
 
132. See DEP’T OF LAB., PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING 
RULES, 3–5 (Aug. 2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/departmentoflaborregulatoryreformplanaugust2
011.pdf. The website appears to have continued in use until 2015. See Shaping 
Smarter Regulations, DEP’T OF LAB. (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) https://dolregs.idea
scale.com/a/ideas/recent/campaign-filter/byids/campaigns/15893/stage/unspecified. 




134. See DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FINAL PLAN, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096 
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-04/pdf/2020-23
888.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEE9-VKGF].  
135. There does not seem to be a definitive tally of regulations subject to the 
sunsetting provision. But given the fact that the NPRM noted that 85% of the pre-
1990 regulations had not been revised, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70111 (Nov. 4, 2020), 
it is likely to be quite significant. 
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B.  Notice-and-Comment for AI Supportive and Augmented Tools 
The informal rulemaking process under the APA “provides 
predictable and meaningful opportunities for interested stakeholders to 
provide input on draft regulations and scrutinize the evidence and analytic 
bases of regulatory proposals.”136 The APA requires agencies to “give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in rulemaking through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments.”137   
OMB has recognized the pivotal role that soliciting public input on 
Notices of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) relating to AI applications 
plays in ensuring that “agencies will benefit from the perspectives and 
expertise of stakeholders engaged in the design, development, deployment, 
operation, and impact of AI applications” and in facilitating “a 
decisionmaking process that is more transparent and accountable.”138 
But, as mentioned at the outset of the article, HHS promulgated its 
first AI rule—the “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative”—without notice-and-
comment.139 HHS explained that the rule made non-substantive changes to 
existing HHS regulations, such as “correcting references to other 
regulations, misspellings and other typographical errors.”140 Indeed, this is 
the very type of “supportive” AI use that academic commentators would 
also place on the other side of the line, not subject to the dictates of the 
APA, including notice-and-comment. 
 
136. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 13.  
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1966).  
138. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 4, 13 (“Agencies must provide ample 
opportunities for the public to provide information and participate in all stages of 
the rulemaking process, to the extent feasible and consistent with legal 
requirements (including legal constraints on participation to, for example, protect 
national security and address imminent threats or respond to emergencies). 
Agencies are also encouraged, to the extent practicable, to inform the public and 
promote awareness and widespread availability of voluntary frameworks or 
standards and the creation of other informative documents.”). Moreover, OMB has 
recognized: 
To the extent feasible, agencies should also provide opportunities 
for stakeholder consultation before the NPRM stage, including 
through the issuance, when appropriate, of RFIs and Advance 
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRMs) to inform decisions 
about the need to regulate. Agencies should also consider holding 
stakeholder and public meetings both prior to issuing an NPRM 
and during the public comment period. 
See also Exec. Order No. 13563, (Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that regulations “shall be 
adopted through a process that involves public participation.”); Exec. Order No. 
13859 (Feb. 11, 2019) (calling on agencies to increase public access to government 
data and models where appropriate).  
139. See supra Section I.B.2.  
140. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020).  
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Consider how these seemingly innocuous categorizations may 
either be used in a highly politicized way or else constitute the first step in 
considerably more substantive endeavors. For example, what if the AI that 
labels subtopics is used to flag industries that the HHS wishes to 
deregulate? (Is this assisted/supportive AI or augmented/determinative AI?) 
Or what if the use of AI to discover regulatory overlap is used by the HHS 
in order to harmonize regulations by finding the least restrictive common 
denominator? What if both of these tools are later on rolled into a larger AI 
tool that flags “excessively burdensome” regulations?141  
Now let’s take a closer look at these questions in the context of the 
HHS’s use of AI for retrospective review. In HHS’s recent Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, “Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory 
Evaluations Timely,” the agency explained: 
The need for a Department-wide regulatory review process 
is also supported by the Department's regulatory reform 
project, which piloted an approach to augment expert 
policy insights with AI-driven data analysis. Machine 
learning surfaced a number of potential reform 
opportunities, identifying over 1,200 CFR section citations 
that merited consideration for reform and 159 CFR sections 
that could benefit from regulatory streamlining based on 
their similarities to other sections.142 
HHS explicitly noted that AI augmented human insights to identify 
“potential reform opportunities.”143 HHS’s pilot project formed the basis, at 
least in part, for the new proposed rule. Here—and in its earlier rule—HHS 
disclosed that AI was used to help identify “outmoded” regulations, but 
there is nary a detail regarding how the AI worked or was used in the 
process.144 Nonetheless, according to the proposed rule, “Regulations that 
have become outmoded will be amended or rescinded.”145   
 
141. Id. at 72899–90 (“Future uses of these technologies to promote 
comprehensive and systematic retrospective review will continue to algorithmically 
refine identification of potentially ‘outmoded’ regulations and will seek algorithmic 
characterization of other regulatory targets of Exec. Order No. 13563—regulations 
which are ‘ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome’, as candidates for 
SME review and potential reform.”).  
142. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 70096, 70111 (Nov. 4, 2020). 
143. Id. And to what extent does it matter from a procedural/transparency 
perspective whether a human or AI tool is doing the flagging for a particular 
(non)innocuous action? It might even be better from a transparency perspective if 
we had the AI tool doing the less innocuous task because in many ways it is more 
scrutable than a person.  
144. Id.  
145. Id. 
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The proposed rule points to various factors used to target 
regulations for retrospective review. AI technologies—especially in light of 
the functionalities of the RegExplorer tool—could play a significant role in 
many of them (although HHS does not take the opportunity to discuss this). 
First, the proposed rule mentions “[t]he continued need for the Regulation, 
consideration of which shall include but not be limited to the extent to 
which the Regulation defines terms of sets standards used in or otherwise 
applicable to other Federal rules.”146 And it also points to “[t]he extent to 
which the Regulation overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with other Federal 
rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local governmental rules.147 
As discussed above, the RegExplorer tool’s “Compare” function, which 
uses AI (subtopic classification) to identify areas of regulatory overlap, is 
poised to assist here. Second, the proposed rule adverts to “[t]he complexity 
of the regulation.”148 Recall that RegData attempts to identify this as well, 
and RegExplorer may offer an AI-based augmentation.149  Third, the rule 
highlights “[t]he degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other 
factors have changed in the area affected by the Regulation since the 
Regulation was promulgated or the last time the Regulation was reviewed 
by the Department.”150 AI would define the “area” i.e., the “subtopic.” 
Additionally, RegExplorer would generally be useful to quickly flag 
regulations which have not been reviewed for a while.   
HHS should identify where AI will come into play in the 
assessment of these retrospective review factors. By neglecting to inform 
the public of where AI will sit in the review process, no one will be able to 
provide meaningful feedback on HHS’s use of AI (and specifically 
Deloitte’s RegExplorer tool) to perform different tasks.151 HHS should also 
provide further details describing when and how the AI will be used to 
“support” or “augment” human decision-making. Thus, for example, to 
return to the factor regarding overlapping, duplicative, or conflicting 
regulations, HHS might disclose something akin to: “To identify such 
 
146. Id. at 70121.  
147. Id.  
148. Id.  
149. Ethan Greist, How to Use QuantGov, QUANTGOV (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.quantgov.org/how-to-use-quantgov [https://perma.cc/259K-2BET]. 
RegData apparently utilizes a keyword search for “restrictive" terms like “shall,” 
“may not,” “must,” “required,” and “prohibited.” A more sophisticated AI 
application of this keyword search would be to apply what RegExplorer did with 
subtopic analysis to restrictiveness. In other words, the same way an algorithm uses 
machine learning to identify that “fishing boat” and “ship” talk about the same 
thing, it would use the restriction keywords like “shall” or “must” to train the 
model to identify other restriction terms.  
150. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 70096, 70121 (Nov. 4, 2020). 
151. See generally Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127, at 18–19.  
406 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 374 
regulations, RegExplorer, an AI tool developed by Deloitte, was used to 
identify topics (e.g., “dog” or “ice cream”) and industries (e.g., “electrical 
engineering”). Any topical overlaps for definitional disparities were then 
flagged for human review.”  
But here, I would push even further—especially in light of the fact 
that the “human in the loop” has garnered talismanic significance in terms 
of shielding AI uses from disclosure and review by casting them in a 
“support” role.152 The APA’s notice-and-comment mandate has been 
interpreted to require that agencies make publicly available the critical 
information—including studies, data, and methodologies—underlying 
proposed rules.153 In Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, the D.C. 
Circuit remanded the EPA’s order establishing “standards of performance” 
rules because the EPA’s failure to disclose the basic data relied upon 
suppressed the ability for meaningful comment.154 Notably—and in light of 
the existing line-drawing efforts to distinguish “supportive” from 
“determinative” uses of AI—the data in question that was suppressed 
merely represented “a partial basis” for the overall rule.155 Four years later, 
Nova Scotia struck down an FDA rule for “failure to disclose the basic data 
relied upon,” which in turn obviated any opportunity for meaningful 
comment on the proposed rule.156 The threshold set by Ruckelshaus and 
 
152. Vikram Singh Bisen, What is Human in the Loop Machine Learning: Why 
& How Used in AI?, VSINGHBISEN (May 20, 2020), https://medium.com/vsingh
bisen/what-is-human-in-the-loop-machine-learning-why-how-used-in-ai-60c7b44e
b2c0 [https://perma.cc/G24T-DF24].  
153. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
154. Id. at 402.  
155. Id. at 392 (finding a critical defect in the decision-making process in 
arriving at the standard under review in the initial inability of petitioners to 
obtain—in timely fashion—the test results and procedures used on existing plants 
which formed a partial basis for the emission control level adopted, and in the 
subsequent seeming refusal of the agency to respond to what seem to be legitimate 
problems with the methodology of these tests) (emphasis added). See also id. at 
393 (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to 
promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that [in] critical degree, 
is known only to the agency.”). But see Cooling Water Intake Structure Coal. v. 
United States EPA, 905 F.3d 49, 78 (2nd Cir. 2018) (“Unless the scientific material 
discussed in the biological opinion ultimately formed the ‘basis’ of the EPA’s rule, 
the public was not entitled to comment on it.”) (citing United States v. Nova Scotia 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
156. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (“To suppress meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data 
relied upon is akin to rejecting comment altogether. For unless there is common 
ground, the comments are unlikely to be of a quality that might impress a careful 
agency. The inadequacy of comment in turn leads in the direction of arbitrary 
decision-making.”). 
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Nova Scotia, requiring disclosure of the basic data underlying the rule, 
points in the direction of agency disclosure of training data.157 Thus, in 
addition to HHS disclosing how Deloitte’s RegExplorer tool was used, the 
agency should provide information about the training data, the process for 
classifying subtopics, how the clustering algorithm works and with what 
accuracy. 
Of course, disclosure and public participation can be taken too far. 
Two sets of caveats are typically invoked. First, “current technical 
challenges in creating interpretable AI can make it difficult for agencies to 
ensure a level of transparency necessary for humans to understand the 
decision-making of AI applications.”158 Second, “[w]hat constitutes 
appropriate disclosure and transparency is context-specific, depending on 
assessments of potential harms (including those resulting from the 
exploitation of disclosed information), the magnitude of those harms, the 
 
157. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable 
Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1882–83 (2019) (arguing 
that, in order to provide adequate accountability and a generalizability check on the 
AI tool, an agency must publish “information treated as part of the record for 
backing up the rule” including “summary information about the training data, 
explanations about how it was sourced, descriptions of validation process, and 
validation results”). Other scholars coalesce around a similarly granular level of 
disclosure. Aziz Huq recommends that a “datasheet” accompany an algorithmic 
decision, that “records the choices and manipulations of training data, and the 
‘composition, collection process, recommended uses, and so on’ of the raiding 
data.” Constitutional Rights in the Machine Learning State, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 
48 (2020) (referencing Timnit Gebru et al., Datasheets for datasets, arXiv preprint 
ariv:1803.09010, at 2 (2018)). Coglianese & Lehr suggest that there should be 
disclosure of “all iterations of an algorithm or alternative algorithms that were 
considered, their predictions, and their corresponding specifications.” Coglianese & 
Lehr, supra note 105, at 1211.  
158. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3. Trade secret protection issues are often 
raised at this juncture. See, e.g., David Rubenstein, The Outsourcing of Algorithmic 
Governance, YALE J. REG. (Jan. 19, 2021) (“When procured from private vendors, 
AI systems may be shrouded in trade secrecy, which can impede public 
transparency and accountability.”), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-outsourcing-
of-algorithmic-governance-by-david-s-rubenstein/. Strandburg and Huq dismiss 
these concerns for different reasons. For Strandburg, if confidentiality agreements 
or trade secret protections would prohibit the disclosure of summary information 
regarding the training data (e.g. sourcing, validation techniques, and results), then 
rulemaking entities should not sign those agreements or source those technologies. 
Strandburg, supra note 157, at 1882–84. Huq argues that protective orders solve 
countervailing intellectual property concerns. Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127, at 49 
(“It is difficult to see how any of these disclosure obligations would impinge upon 
intellectual property interests in algorithmic design, even on the assumption that 
such an interest was a substantial one, given the availability of a protective order.”). 
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technical state of the art, and the potential benefits of the AI application.”159 
With regard to the use of AI in retrospective review, the oft-invoked worry 
about adversarial gaming does not pertain due to the retrospective nature of 
the activity.   
CONCLUSION 
Scholars have made valiant attempts to scale the level of required 
disclosure to the significance of the AI in the process160 or the significance 
of the policy in which it is embedded.161 But, as the HHS case study 
illustrates, there is an unaddressed risk that a “supportive” AI role could 
morph into an “augmented” one driving an  automated search process that 
uses some algorithm to propose rules for review that continues to evade 
notice-and-comment and meaningful public scrutiny.162 A better solution 
may be the establishment of a bright line for AI, requiring that an NPRM 
always articulate (1) the policy-level purpose of the AI-
supportive/augmented tool, (2) the factors it influences in the evaluation 
process, (3) how it was trained or developed, and perhaps even (4) what it 
may be used for in the future. 
 
 
159. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3. Another possible concern/caveat, raised by 
Strandburg, considers chilling effects or negative repercussions (e.g. pressure on 
regulatory loopholes) of too much disclosure. If the bar for required NPRM 
disclosure is too high, i.e. if it requires narrative mapping from cases to outcomes, 
then “inscrutable decision tools simply cannot be incorporated into APA rules.” 
Strandburg, supra note 157, at 1881. Also, with a high bar, people will either 
prohibit the use of AI for significant rules (which is bad because of their benefits) 
or officials will simply reinterpret or narrow the scenarios where explanation is 
required. Id. at 1881–82. 
160. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 105.  
161. Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127.  
162. It is worth noting that disclosure must also be adequate for oversight by 
various internal and external actors—a significant topic that must be taken up 
elsewhere. Here, I highlight the significant role played by OIRA. OIRA has 
historically played a coordinating role among federal agencies. The Trump 
Administration’s December 3, 2020 “Executive Order on Promoting the Use of 
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government” charges OIRA with 
extending its coordinating role in the sphere of AI: “When OIRA designates AI-
related draft regulatory action as ‘significant’ for purposes of interagency review 
under Executive Order 12866, OIRA will ensure that all agencies potentially 
affected by or interested in a particular action will have an opportunity to provide 
input.” OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 7. 
 
